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Introduction 
 
As the G20 meeting has risen in prominence as the premier global forum, attention has necessarily 
focused on its governance mechanisms and effectiveness.  This paper considers these issues and 
the appropriateness of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a way of improving decision-
making.  
 
The G20 started its life as a regular meeting of the finance ministers and central bank governors of 
the world’s 19 richest economies plus the European Union. It was founded in the wake of the fi-
nancial crises of the late 1990s, acknowledging the fact that key emerging-market economies were 
inadequately represented in global economic governance. The recent row over Christine Lagarde 
as yet another European head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – following the departure 
of her predecessor Dominique Strauss-Kahn – again showed how the Bretton-Woods institutions 
are increasingly lacking credibility with many emerging players. In this particular case the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) even joined ranks to publicly criticize the 
way the IMF succession was handled (Harding et al., 2011). Against the backdrop of evident shifts 
in economic and political importance from West to East (Quah, 2011) it seems unsurprising that 
new governance institutions such as the G20 are likely to gain in importance in the absence of 
credible alternatives. 
 
It was therefore also unsurprising that during and since the great recession of 2007/2008 the G20 
became the key forum for coordinating economic policy responses designed to stabilize the global 
financial and economic system. It was also appreciated as an institution by the installation of regu-
lar G20 summits at head of state or government level. There has been some interesting recent 
research on the effectiveness of the G20 in a variety of different policy fields and its relationships to 
institutions such as the UN and the G8. The common conclusion of this research was that ‘the G-
20 must extend its mandate beyond economic crisis management if it wishes to establish itself 
permanently as a key global governance body’ (Cooper and Helleiner, 2010). And indeed there is 
some early evidence that issues such as food and commodity prices as well as climate change 
related issues might be part of the future G20 agenda (Euractiv.com, 2010). 
 
But the G20 has also revealed significant shortcomings, which need to be overcome if it is to suc-
ceed as an effective global governance institution. Consequently, the way it evolves as an 
institution is key for its future role as a global governance mechanism. 
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This study seeks to make an intellectual contribution to the debate about G20 evolution. We would 
like to address three areas in particular: First, we will present an analysis of the G20’s shortcom-
ings that are currently preventing it from operating effectively. Second, against this backdrop we 
will scrutinise the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) experience in the European Union (EU) 
and extract some of its key functions and principles. And finally, we will use these principles and 
make some concrete proposals – in the broader context of the G20’s challenges – for how the 
OMC experience could be used to engineer adapted policy mechanisms for the G20 that would 
significantly improve its effectiveness. 
 
 
The G20 - Main Challenges 
 
In considering this ambition, it is necessary to identify the primary challenges facing the G20 as a 
global decision-making institution. Identified are four main challenges for the G20 going forward: 
(1) the shift from ‘single issue’ emergency institution to one of permanent global governance; (2) 
follow-through effectiveness; (3) overcoming the’ prisoner’s dilemma; (4) the problem of ‘input le-
gitimacy’. 
 
1. Transition to Permanent Global Governance Institution 
 
The contrast between recent G20 meetings and those at the nadir of the global economic crisis is 
stark. The cooperation, inclusiveness and single mindedness of the 2009 London G20 was charac-
terized by an exertion of charismatic political power disassociated with politico-economic might.  As 
a result, it can be said to have been broadly inclusive; an observation, which is all the more notable 
given the array of countries given a voice at the top table heretofore excluded from the narrow 
G7/8 framework. Convened as a direct response to the global ‘emergency’ which had unfolded in 
the preceding months, the meeting very quickly agreed to intervene in a coordinated fashion to 
stabilize the global banking system and to pump billions of dollars, yen, renminbi, euros, pounds 
and the rest, by way of fiscal stimulus, into the international economy (Cooper and Helleiner, 
2010).  
 
This period saw the G20 emerge as a single issue emergency institution (also often referred to as 
G20 1.0). Accordingly, it can be said to have enjoyed a clear strategic mission to which participants 
were broadly committed, consequently empowering individual country delegates to act foremost in 
the collective interest. In terms of achieving its strategic mission, results can be judged a rapid 
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success, leading to enthusiasm about what could be achieved in the future. But ultimately the ex-
perience was also one of structural dysfunctionality. 
 
This early momentum and perceived success led to the institution stating its mandate to be ‘the 
premier forum for international economic co-operation’ (G-20, 2011a). By Paris 2011, however, the 
G20 Finance Ministers struggled to agree even on the blandest of communiqués (G-20, 2011b). 
Both the rapidity of early success and the new kind of global problems share responsibility for this 
turnaround. Stabilization of the global economy diluted the G20’s ‘emergency’ mission and allowed 
individual countries to revert to pursuit of narrow domestic interests. Meanwhile, the cost of inter-
vention for domestic treasuries and the reassertion of global markets helped transform the crisis 
from one of global proportions to one of disparate regional crises.   
 
The short history of the modern G20 suggests that the more recent experience is a truer reflection 
of the norm. While the forum has moved beyond the G20 1.0 emergency institution, there is pro-
gress to be made before it can be seen as one of permanent global governance (G20 2.0). The 
challenge it faces in moving clear of this state of limbo is not simply that of being able to agree on 
substantive communiqués but also develop the capability to follow through on agreements.   
 
2. Follow-Through Effectiveness 
 
The follow-through argument leads to the closely connected second major challenge of the G20. 
There is the justified criticism that the G20 lacks effectiveness, as it is unclear how the agreements 
of a G20 meeting, usually published in the communiqué, are implemented on a national or regional 
level and how this policy implementation is monitored and evaluated. The G20 itself does not cur-
rently have the means or cohesive authority to do this. Its meetings are organized by a troika of 
host nations without the help of a permanent structure. The troika system is meant to provide some 
degree of consistency but has not been able to prevent punitive criticism about the effectiveness of 
the G20 framework. It was therefore predictable that the enthusiasm for the G20 became more 
muted after its initial successes as a crisis mechanism (Cooper and Helleiner, 2011). 
 
So the key question about the effectiveness of the G20 is: In what way can the institution evolve 
and create mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of what amounts to agree-
ments in principle on the global level? 
 
  
Henning Meyer, Stephen Barber and Chris Luenen: The Open Method of Coordination  
10 
 
This problem of effectiveness is not limited to the G20 but was also evident in the G8 framework.  
Many people will remember the high profile ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign that lobbied the G8 
six years ago to redesign aid policies and write off Third World debt. Five years later the NGO Ox-
fam criticized that France, Germany, Italy and Japan all failed to live up to their promises (Godfrey, 
2010). In this particular example there was at least NGO monitoring of progress but in many cases 
NGOs will be unable to fulfill this function and at any rate ‘rank’ below the G20 in global authority. 
So an effective follow-up process to implement communiqué agreements within the G20 frame-
work is a crucial area for reform. 
 
3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
The great challenge in longer-term strategic stability of the G20 centres on the more intangible 
nature of participant behaviour. The meetings which can be judged a success were characterized 
by higher ambition and shared goals than by the sort of self-interested negotiation and indeed bar-
gaining that is more often associated with international summit making.   
 
The prisoner’s dilemma (Lane, 2006) is a very real challenge to G20 success. World leaders, es-
pecially those with democratic mandates, are frequently dis-incentivised from supporting goals 
judged as being of collective benefit since they must face both ways: outwards across the globe 
yes, but crucially inwards, satisfying domestic public opinion and national interests. Indeed, one 
might observe limited incentives to make the sort of sacrifices often required in this high stake di-
plomacy.  There is no better example of this than environmental talks, which have tended to 
descend into a process whereby delegates attempt to ‘win’ the best deal they are able to for their 
own countries to the exclusion of the mutual interest of reducing carbon emissions. Any framework 
needs to be mindful of this need for players to be able to act in the global not simply the national 
interest. The test will be whether the G20 is able to tackle effectively the great issues facing the 
world today, above all issues associated with the global economy and the environment. 
 
4. Input Legitimacy 
 
The emergence of the G20 as the appropriate forum for world leaders to coordinate action aimed 
at tackling the economic crisis was judged not only in terms of necessity since the newer players of 
the China-led East remain unrepresented on the narrow, largely North Atlantic, G7 but also as a 
meeting which commanded greater legitimacy and global reach. Indeed, such reliance was placed 
on China and India in particular during the emergency stage process that questions arose about 
the legitimacy of existing institutions of economic global governance: the Washington based IMF  
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and World Bank where emerging economy interests remain dramatically under-represented in 
terms of voting rights in favour of European nations and the United States (Menkhoff and Meyer, 
2010). The G20 can be said to represent something in the region of two thirds of the world popula-
tion more equally. 
 
While the G20 is broader in terms of representation than the G7 (or G8 which includes Russia) and 
can be said to more legitimately represent both hemispheres, it is by no means perfect. The mem-
bership of twenty is a largely arbitrary number and since the European Union is one of these, 
member states who also attend the G20 (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) are effectively repre-
sented twice. Spain and the Netherlands, both in the EU, sit outside the G20 but have attended 
meetings. Furthermore, the G20 has been self-selecting and includes countries of systemic signifi-
cance rather than simply as measured in terms of wealth. Indeed, Spain and the Netherlands rank 
ninth and sixteenth respectively in GDP terms according to 2009 World Bank figures (World Bank, 
2011).  Elsewhere, an outsider to both the G20 and EU and vocal critic has been Norway, which 
believes it has no effective voice in discussions of potentially momentous decision-making.   
 
While the G20 can be said to represent two thirds of the world’s people, 170 countries do not have 
a place at the table and beyond South Africa that includes every African country. Proposals for a 
G20 plus 5 with rotating additional membership perhaps only assuage the chagrin of those coun-
tries attaining representation rather than seriously challenge the question of input legitimacy (Wade 
and Vestergaard, 2011b, Wade and Vestergaard, 2011a). 
 
A further connected challenge is to design a framework that allows the G20 to evolve and reform. 
Lessons can be learned here from the static nature of the Bretton Woods institutions and the 
United Nations, which still reflect the post Second World War world rather than the power balances 
in the aftermath of global economic crisis in the twenty first century. Care must be taken not to 
freeze-frame today’s power balances for evermore. 
 
 
Addressing the Challenges 
 
There is a distinction between the first and the last two challenges. The prisoner’s dilemma and 
arguably also the issue of input legitimacy will always exist. If there were a G30, country number 
31 would be likely to complain. And the alternatives put forward by the main critics – a fundamental 
reform of the Bretton Woods institutions (Vestergaard, 2011) – seem equally difficult. Not only is  
there the historical baggage the Bretton Woods institutions carry, but there are also severe ques-
tions about how a body including around 190 countries could take effective decisions if it were 
Henning Meyer, Stephen Barber and Chris Luenen: The Open Method of Coordination  
12 
 
consensus-based as is the G20. If there are so many veto players (Tsebelis, 2002) it is virtually 
impossible to agree on meaningful policies. This is not to say that the input legitimacy criticism is 
itself illegitimate. But the issue here is a practical one. 
 
The authors believe that in order to address the first two challenges – to make a successful transi-
tion to the G20 2.0 and increase the institution’s effectiveness - there are practical steps that canbe 
taken. Those steps, however, require fundamental reforms. And when attempting to evaluate these 
reforms, the European Union and its history as a laboratory for governance mechanisms is a valu-
able comparison. Of course, there will not be supranationalization on the global level any time 
soon. But the European Union has also more than a decade worth of experience with the most 
advanced governance mechanism that sits in-between supranationalization and loose cooperation 
(what the G20 currently has). And this is the OMC. 
 
 
The Open Method of Cooperation (OMC)  Origins 
OMC is an intergovernmental form of governance drawing on soft power and best practice.  The 
OMC was introduced in the European Union in 2000 as part of the Lisbon Agenda, which was 
meant to turn the Union into the most competitive area in the world. In order to achieve this aim, it 
was judged that the EU needs better and more structured ways to cooperate in policy fields not 
covered by the ‘community method’, under which policy competencies are supranationalized. For 
this reason, the OMC developed further the experiences of the 1990s with the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the European Employment Strategy (EES) and created a new set 
of processes (Zeitlin, 2009). It is important to note that the OMC is not a rigid procedure that is du-
plicated across a diverse set of policy areas. It is because it is applied to a diverse set of policy 
areas that the OMC is a rather flexible approach based on four procedural principles. Zeitlin 
describes these principles as follows: 
 
1. Fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals 
which they set in the short, medium and long term 
2. Establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks 
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sec-
tors as a means of comparing best practises 
3. Translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific 
targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences 
4. Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning processes 
(Zeitlin, 2009) 
 
In the application of the OMC, the second point deserves special attention. In practise the Euro-
pean Commission pursues policy convergence via the OMC rather than – as stated above – the  
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mere comparison of best practise (Hodson, 2004) and therefore assisted national policy-learning. 
Apart from the self-defeating logic of this process – if policies converge there is less and less to 
compare and hence there would be a stifling of policy innovation and everybody would tend to 
adopt a rather similar and rigid policy framework (Kerber and Eckardt, 2007) – there is also the 
question whether the European Commission actually has the authority to pursue policy conver-
gence in the areas covered by the OMC. 
 
It is this implicit aim of policy convergence and the comparison against the community method that 
leads to slightly distorted judgement of the OMC. Of course, if convergence across the Union is the 
main aim the OMC must look ineffective. First, in the supranationalized policy fields the Union has 
the authority to legislate directly for all members so there is a straightforward process. Second, 
when evaluating the effectiveness of the OMC it cannot only be difficult to justify the pursuit of pol-
icy convergence but even more to prove that policy convergence when it happens is a result of 
OMC processes. The empirical study of OMC effectiveness is exceedingly challenging and suffers 
from a variety of methodological problems, above all how to isolate the OMC as a single factor. 
Academic opinion is split as to whether the OMC is a useful tool for policy convergence (Zeitlin, 
2009). 
 
 
OMC, OECD, IMF and G20 
 
In the academic discussion, the OMC has also been compared to procedures within the OECD and 
the IMF, from which it has also drawn inspiration. OECD economic surveys monitor whether mem-
ber states follow the code of conduct for healthy economic policies as described by the OECD 
convention. OECD economic surveys are regular monitoring and evaluation procedures for each 
country and are based on peer-pressure (Schaefer, 2006). In the case of the IMF, consultations 
under Article IV spring to mind. And the Fund has considerable scope to impose its policy prescrip-
tion to debtor countries as loans always come with attached policy conditionality that is based on 
the Fund’s financial programming approach (Buira, 1983). The fact that policies based on this 
rather rigid method tend to produce one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions has been a frequent criti-
cism of the IMF (Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
When simply comparing organizational procedures, there might be a degree of similarity. But what 
is largely missing from these comparisons is a reflection on the nature of the institution in which 
these processes take place. The OECD describes itself as a policy forum ‘in which governments 
can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. We work with  
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governments to understand what drives economic, social and environmental change’ (OECD, 
2011). But the OECD does not bring together heads of government or state on a regular basis to 
take major decisions on current policy issues. The OECD is much more a traditional policy forum 
that analyzes, evaluates and tries to influence and assist national decision-making by peer-review. 
It is by far not as high-level as the G20 and also suffers from a membership that is not representa-
tive of current global structures. 
 
The comparison to the IMF is even less insightful for the purpose of this study. Apart from the diffi-
culty to reform the IMF into a consensus-based decision-making body, it is generally not designed 
for this kind of policy-making. The Fund indeed has some advisory function that is also based on 
monitoring and peer-pressure, but the institution is mainly associated with providing member coun-
tries with concessional and non-concessional credit lines and technical assistance to overcome 
severe economic problems (Schaefer, 2006). This help usually comes with policy conditionality to 
which the affected country has to agree or face the cessation of financial help. The IMF does not 
bring global political leaders together either. It is run by a managing director who heads an execu-
tive board that is ultimately accountable to the institution’s highest decision-making body: the 
Board of Governors, which meets annually and consists of representatives of the IMF’s 187 mem-
ber countries. One can compare procedures across different international bodies but one has to 
bear in mind the nature and purpose of these institutions when doing so. 
 
Against this backdrop, can the OMC be categorized as a governance mechanism sui generis? The 
answer is: yes and no, depending on the elements one considers and how pure an understanding 
of sui generis is applied. As argued above the setting of the OMC in the EU framework is unique as 
an intergovernmental form of governance in a supranational institution. The procedural elements of 
the OMC on the other hand resemble more of an evolution of pre-existing EU practices that were 
further inspired by procedures applied in other international organizations. From this follows that 
there are two important aspects that need to be analytically captured: the institutional context and 
the procedural mechanisms. 
 
So what does all of this mean for the G20? The G20 as a governance institution is more similar to 
the intergovernmental elements of the EU than either the OECD or the IMF as it seeks to direct 
global policy at the highest level and takes decisions to which all member governments agree in 
principle. The problem for the G20 is to translate these agreements into practical steps to be taken 
by member governments and to evaluate these steps. Therefore one of the main focal points of 
OMC criticism and discussion – whether it brings about policy convergence or not – is irrelevant for 
the G20 context. At the G20 level countries would not agree to any mechanism that would bring  
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about policy convergence. Mutual policy-learning and the spread of best practise could be a goal, 
but only a secondary one. The point here is that OMC is used not so much as a journey but rather 
as a mechanism for expansion and contraction as is necessary.                   
 
 
The Reform Path towards G20 2.0 
When talking about a reform path for the G20 it is important to first of all bear some general les-
sons in mind. Above all, the G20 should learn from the post-World War Two institutions that are 
now coming more and more under pressure and develop a mechanism with which the constitution 
of the institution itself can be adjusted to changing realities. Institutional gridlock that prevents nec-
essary adjustments must be avoided. As G20 decisions are consensus-based, the problem of input 
legitimacy is an important aspect in this context. Could the composition of the G20 change? And 
how is the insider-outsider problem addressed? There are some interesting developments cur-
rently being discussed. 
 
First of all, as Andrew Cooper stated, the outsider countries do normally not revert to questioning 
the general G20 approach but seek inclusion: 
 
Significantly, however, this does not mean that non-members have adopted a strictly op-
positional stance towards the G20. Rather than outright rejection, the preference has been 
a search for inclusion. The G20 is viewed as having some positive features but remains in 
need of further adjustment in order to maximise its benefits to a greater range of countries 
(Cooper, 2011). 
 
Since the South Korea G20 last year there have been interesting developments. Above all the 
concept of G20+5 – where 5 strategically important non-G20 countries are invited to attend the 
meetings – has been a fairly well received step to develop a more inclusive approach. As Cooper 
suggested, this approach could be extended to include regions rather than countries. By adding a 
network approach, wider participation in the G20 process could be secured by having regional 
groupings represented in some form (Cooper, 2011). Given that the EU, as a regional grouping, is 
a full member there is certainly scope to look more detailed into the possibility of involving regional 
networks and by doing so address issues related to input legitimacy and geographical imbalances.  
 
Second, the G20 needs a stronger institutional setup. The idea to introduce a permanent G20 se-
cretariat, that was first proposed by the South Korean G20 presidency last year, was initially also  
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championed by this year’s G20 host France (Euractiv.com, 2010). The idea was also supported by 
important emerging economies such as China and Brazil whilst some more G7 focused countries 
such as Italy and Japan were opposed (The Chosunilbo, 2010). In the priorities of the French G20 
presidency as published on the official website, however, there is no mention of the further institu-
tionalization of the G20 by introducing a permanent structure that would work alongside the 
rotating presidency (G20-G8 France 2011, 2011).  
 
To enhance G20 capabilities, however – especially if there are meant to be more outreach mecha-
nisms as described above – a permanent secretariat is indispensible. The current troika structure 
of rotating presidencies of countries from different world regions – which seems to be influenced by 
the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union – is simply not capable of accom-
plishing all tasks the G20 needs to take on if it wants to become a regular institution of global 
governance. The current presidency holder France and the 2012 presidency holder Mexico need to 
put the creation of a permanent institutional structure back on the agenda if they are serious about 
establishing the G20 as a leading governance institution. 
 
Having addressed these institutional issues the major problem of G20 effectiveness still needs to 
be resolved. It is the key argument of this paper that G20 effectiveness could be greatly enhanced 
by adopting an adjusted form of the European Union’s OMC. The OMC is of particular relevance to 
the G20 since gatherings in the immediate aftermath of the global economic crisis were character-
ised by a dysfunctionality borne of the economic and political dominance of the USA and China 
together with their diverging trade interests and policy dispositions. Bilateral discussions between 
the so called ‘G2’ have dominated the agenda to the exclusion of European and other nations who 
were invited to line up in support of one side or the other. It can also be observed that such domi-
nance was less than edifying; the stand-off resulting in diplomatic stalemate. The G20 experience 
highlights not only the challenge of big player dominance but also the need to form some frame-
work in order to mitigate such effect. The OMC as a procedure that binds all players into a 
common process has the potential to produce such a mitigating effect. 
 
To operationalize an OMC for the G20 a permanent secretariat is also essential as supervising 
such a process would overburden national bureaucracies involved in the rotating presidencies and 
independence of evaluation needs to be guaranteed. As mentioned above, the key European 
benchmark for evaluating OMC success – whether it brings about policy convergence or not – is 
irrelevant in the G20 context although a ‘best practise and lessons learned’ programme could be a 
valuable if secondary goal. So liberated from the policy convergence point of view it is worthwhile 
to elaborate the principles of a G20 OMC or answer the question: how does one adapt the OMC to 
the G20?  
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The main objective is to design a political process following the four key principles of the OMC as 
described by Zeitlin. Again, the flexibility built into the OMC – that it is not a rigid process followed 
in the same manner across diverse policy areas – is a valuable characteristic for adapting it to dif-
ferent institutional settings.  
 
So what needs to be done? First, the agreements of G20 communiqués have to be developed into 
more specific short-, mid- and long-term goals that are linked to specific timetables. This can be 
done in cooperation and agreement with national governments in the aftermath of G20 summits. 
Second, these goals need to be further broken down into quantitative and qualitative indicators that 
do not follow one-size-fits-all approaches but take the individual circumstances of members into 
account. Again, this would be a task a permanent G20 secretariat would accomplish in cooperation 
with national governments and bureaucracies. In a third step, specific regional and national policies 
would be developed to achieve these goals. On top of the G20 national government cooperation, 
this step could be assisted by the inclusion of existing institutions with an advisory function such as 
the IMF. There should not be a doubling up of advisory capabilities, which would maybe even give 
different advice, if there are no clear reasons for doing so. And fourth, there needs to be perma-
nent evaluation and peer review to assess whether members are on track to fulfilling the 
commitments they signed up to in the communiqué. This process would involve the G20 secreta-
riat producing regular reports on progress made and pointing to policy areas in which advancement 
has not been as expected. This process would follow a peer-review practice and, as an OMC for 
the G20 would also be a soft-law procedure, would rely on naming and shaming and peer pressure 
if progress in specific areas were sluggish. 
 
In framing the procedures of the G20 arrangements, care needs to be taken to ensure the organi-
sation remains consensus driven also in the interaction between the secretariat and individual 
governments. This could be problematic given the role and potential power of the secretariat, 
which would engage in the interpretation of communiqués and bilateral agreements with member 
governments as well as have the ultimate power to evaluate and recommend. The model should, 
therefore, tend towards those collaborative matters of primary and immediate interest to all. 
 
Apart from the need to preserve the consensual character of the G20 to secure continued buy-in 
by member governments, an OMC for the G20 should also create a broader scope to increase the 
number of stakeholders in the process. As indicated above, an opening up of the OMC procedure 
could be linked to G20 outreach activities meant to address the input legitimacy problem (for in-
stance G20+5). Also, the process should be opened up to civil society players and international 
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organizations. These closer links into society and the wider architecture of international organiza-
tions would potentially increase the power of peer pressure as the number and variety of peers 
would increase. The G20 would also benefit from the diverse input into its policy process and fur-
ther enhance its legitimacy as an international governance institution. 
 
Such a broad and inclusive OMC for the G20 cannot be run in a static manner. It would therefore 
depend on the policy fields addressed – if the G20 was to broaden its remit – what civil society 
groups and international organizations were to be part of the OMC. In the case of growth and jobs 
it would for instance be helpful to include the international trade union movement and the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) in the process as well as employer’s associations. If the G20 were 
to address environmental issues the participation of organizations such as Greenpeace and the 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) would be very helpful. The flexible adaptability of 
the OMC to different policy settings is a very helpful feature in this context. 
 
Of course, comprehensive reform such as the introduction of an OMC would not be easy; but it 
would certainly help the effectiveness of the G20 process. First of all, member countries would be 
forced to reflect on what the sometimes loftily worded communiqué goals mean for their own coun-
tries and how progress towards these goals can be made and evaluated. This in itself would create 
a new follow-up process in which member countries would need to demonstrate in much more de-
tail than hitherto how they intend to achieve the political goals they signed up for. And second, an 
OMC for the G20 would bind all members into a common process that would take place perma-
nently and not just in the preparation of summits. It would be an important institutionalization of a 
mechanism that so far lacks permanent structures and procedures. 
 
Conclusion 
The basic argument for global governance – the need to regulate and channel the many social, 
economic, environmental, technological and cultural processes that now transcend the limits of 
national and regional governance – is more relevant than ever. With existing global governance 
institutions suffering from their deficiencies and international talks on important issues such as 
global trade and climate change often stalled or unsuccessful, there is a real need for governance 
institutions that involve the key global players and are capable of effectively addressing pressing 
global policy issues. 
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In this context, the ascendancy of the G20 has been a breath of fresh air even though it remains 
incomplete as an institution and its success will be determined whether the four key challenges it 
faces can be successfully addressed. The move from an emergency institution to a permanent 
component of global governance will crucially depend on how the effectiveness of the G20 can be 
further improved. We have made the case for why we think that an adopted version of the Euro-
pean Union’s OMC would be an important structural reform to fundamentally improve G20 
effectiveness. The scope of this study did not permit to develop our proposal in great detail. Our 
main aim, moreover, was to sketch out the basic principles of an OMC for the G20 and, crucially, 
set them in the context of the broader discussion of G20 evolution and reform. The full potential of 
the proposed introduction of an OMC for the G20 only becomes apparent when viewed against the 
backdrop of the G20’s broader problems and challenges. 
This paper should be seen as a contribution to the on-going academic and public debates sur-
rounding the G20 process and we would like to thank the Bertelsmann Foundation for giving us 
the opportunity to work on our ideas and giving us the platform to publish our proposals. 
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